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Abstract
Within a simple model of di¤erentiated oligopoly, we show that
tacit collusion may be prevented by the threat of nationalising a pri-
vate rm coupled with the appropriate choice of the weight given to
private prots in the maximand of the nationalised company. We char-
acterise the properties of such a threat and prove that it may allow to
credibly deter tacit collusion.
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1 Introduction
The view that the public rm is one of the instruments to correct market
failures and to improve social welfare is well established.1 The presence of
market failures like those associated to imperfect or distorted competition
may clearly motivate some form of public intervention as, for instance, the
creation of a mixed oligopoly. This outcome may be achieved by the policy
maker either by creating a new (publicly owned2) company or by nation-
alising a private one. The market structure emerging from such operation
can then be viewed as intermediate between the extreme situations of com-
plete government ownership and control, and private ownership restricted by
close government supervision in the form of regulation and anti-trust laws
(Merrill and Schneider, 1966, p. 400).
While we share the above view about the ability of public rms in correct-
ing market failures, in this paper we focus on the capacity of nationalization
in preventing the important instance of market failure represented by collu-
sion. More precisely, we shall show that the threat of nationalization may
discipline oligopolistic rms by forcing them not to collude, not even tacitly.
Our paper aims then at lling a gap in the by now large literature on mixed
oligopolies. To the best of our knowledge, indeed, such a literature deals
with the role of a public rm in altering the equilibrium of an otherwise fully
prot-oriented oligopoly. Under di¤erent specications of the oligopolistic
game, this debate has improved our understanding of how the policy maker
may undertake welfare-improving strategies, for instance by nationalising or
privatising rms in an industry.3 However, we believe that the public au-
1See, for instance, the inuential textbook by Stiglitz (1987, pp. 156-7).
2We use the term ownedto identify the agent who takes the relevant decisions.
3After the pioneering paper by Merrill and Schneider (1966), the literature started
growing in the 80s: for instance, Harris and Wiens (1980), De Fraja and Delbono (1987,
1989) and Cremer, Marchand and Thisse (1989, 1991). See De Fraja and Delbono (1990)
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thority may successfully enhance social welfare without playing directly as a
producer inside the market, but simply by (credibly) threatening of doing it.
Within a model of di¤erentiated oligopoly, we actually show that collusion
may be deterred by the threat of nationalising a private company and the
appropriate choice of the weight given to private prot in the nationalised
rms objective function. We characterise the relevant features of such a
threat and show that it may be able to credibly deter collusion among private
rms.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents
the model. Section 3 illustrates the di¤erent scenarios emerging under com-
petitive or collusive behaviour. The strategy of the policy maker to prevent
collusion is presented in section 4, whereas the consequences of the nation-
alization threat on private and public incentives are examined in section 5.
Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
Consider a Cournot market for a di¤erentiated good, served byN = 1; 2; :::; n
fully symmetric single-product rms, all endowed with the same technology.
The demand side is borrowed from Singh and Vives (1984), whereby market
demand for variety i is
pi = a  qi   s
X
j 6=i
qj (1)
where pi and qi are, respectively, price and quantity of variety i, a > 0 is
the reservation price, and s 2 [0; 1] measures the degree of substitutability
between any two varieties. If s = 1; the good is homogeneous, if instead s = 0
for a survey of the early papers and De Fraja (2009) for a more recent account. Excellent
books on these themes are Vickers and Jarrow (1988) and Bös (1991). Public rms may
also represent an instrument to correct environmental externalities (see Dragone et al.,
2014).
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each rm is a monopolist in an isolated market. Parameter s is therefore
an inverse measure of the degree of product di¤erentiation. Technology is
summarised by the cost function Ci = cqi; with c  0. For the sake of
simplicity, and without further loss of generality, we normalise c to zero. As
a result, the prot function of rm i writes i = piqi:
The demand system (1) is generated by the following preference structure
of the representative consumer:
U = a
nX
i=1
qi  
Pn
i=1 q
2
i + 2s
P
j 6=i qiqj
2
(2)
Hence, consumer surplus is
CS = U  
nX
i=1
piqi (3)
If rms perceive an innite horizon ahead, and are not completely my-
opic,4 the folk theorem reminds us that they may implement some degree
of tacit collusion. Since the supergame is noncooperative, the policy maker
would be unable to prevent collusion or to sanction it through standard an-
titrust instruments. However, we are about to show that there is a strategy
allowing the policy maker to deter collusion. The instrument by means of
which the policy maker can do so is the threat of nationalising a single prot-
seeker and assigning it an objective function which is written as follows:
SW = CS + P + b
X
i6=P
i (4)
where P is the prot obtained the publicly owned enterprise in the post-
nationalisation mixed oligopoly (subscript P stands for public), and b > 0
4This amounts to saying that, if rmstime preferences are measured by a discount
factor  2 [0; 1] ; constant over time and common to all rms, the innitely repeated
game generates innitely many equilibria characterised by some degree of collusion for
any positive .
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measures the weight assigned to private prots by the policy maker.5 Expres-
sion (4) is nothing but a standard social welfare function dened in partial
equilibrium, where public and private prots are weighted di¤erently when-
ever b 6= 1.
3 Alternative scenarios
We now illustrate the ex ante and ex post scenarios emerging in the two
alternative perspectives in which private rm either play noncooperatively à
la Cournot-Nash or collude. In the latter case, we will focus on full collusion,
i.e., the case in which private rms locate along the frontier of industry
prots. Irrespective of the behaviour of private rms, in the ex post scenario
generated by nationalisation we shall assume that the public rm plays along
its best reply function to maximise (4).
3.1 The ex ante Cournot oligopoly
The ex ante Cournot-Nash individual prots of the n private rms are
N (n) =
a2
[2 + s (n  1)]2 (5)
where superscript N mnemonics for Nash equilibrium.
If instead rms collude and split evenly the monopoly prots, each of
them gets
M (n) =
a2
4 [1 + s (n  1)] (6)
5Notice that (4) ignores the expenditure involved by the acquisition of one of the n
private rms by the policy maker and the corresponding revenue accruing to the private
seller of such a rm. This is because the two term cancel each other in the social welfare
function.
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where M mnemonics for monopoly. The corresponding social welfare is
SWM (n) = nM (n) + CSM (n) =
a [2  n+ a (2n  1)]
4 [1 + s (n  1)] (7)
3.2 The ex post mixed oligopoly
We now calculate the Nash equilibrium emerging in the industry if one private
rm has been nationalised. The rst order condition (FOC) of the generic
i-th private rm is:
@i
@qi
= a  2qi   s
 
qP +
X
j 6=i
qj
!
= 0 (8)
while the FOC of the public rm is6
@SW
@qP
= a  qP   bs
n 1X
i=1
qi + s
X
j 6=i
qj = 0 (9)
Imposing symmetry upon the output levels of all private rms, we can solve
the system (8-9) to get the equilibrium output levels:
qNP (n  1) =
a [2  s (2 (2  n) + b (n  1))]
s2 [n  2  b (n  1)] + s (n  2) + 2 (10)
qN (n  1) =
a (1  s)
s2 [n  2  b (n  1)] + s (n  2) + 2 (11)
where subscript  mnemonics for prot-seeking. To begin with, lets notice
the following property:
Lemma 1 If b = s = 1; then qNP (n  1) = a and qN (n  1) = 0:
6The public rms reaction function may slope upward (see Delbono and Scarpa, 1995).
However, we will focus on parameter constellations in which it is downward sloping.
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This is the familiar conclusion emerging in a mixed oligopoly with product
homogeneity and constant marginal cost.7 As in our model b and s are not,
in general, equal to one, we need to establish the parametric conditions under
which all output levels are positive in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the
mixed oligopoly.
Lemma 2 qNP (n  1) and qN (n  1) are strictly positive for all b 2

0;bb,
where bb = 2 [1 + s (n  2)]
s (n  1) :
Proof. Output levels (10-11) are both positive i¤ b 2

0;min
nbb; bo ; where
bb = 2 [1 + s (n  2)]
s (n  1) (12)
and
b =
2 + s (n  2) (1 + s)
s2 (n  1) (13)
with b > bb > 0 for all s 2 (0; 1) :
Notice that bb  2 for any admissible values of fn; sg : Therefore, since
b 2

0;bb, outputs qNP (n  1) and qN (n  1) are indeed strictly positive also
in the standard formulation of the social welfare function in which b = 1.
The resulting prots are
NP (n  1) =
a2 [3 + b (n  1)  2n] [2  s (2 (2  n) + b (n  1))] s (1  s)
[2 + s (n  2) + s2 (n  b (n  1)  2)]2
(14)
for the public rm, and
N (n  1) =
a2 (1  s)2
[2 + s (n  2) + s2 (n  b (n  1)  2)]2 (15)
7See De Fraja and Delbono (1987).
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for each of the n   1 private rms. Using (10-11), one can easily compute
consumer surplus CSN (n  1) and social welfare SWN (n  1) :
What if, instead, the n 1 private rms operating in the mixed oligopoly
envisage the possibility of setting up full collusion among themselves? In
such a case, we have to characterise the Nash equilibrium between the cartel
consisting of the entire population of n  1 prot-seeking rms setting their
output levels to maximise joint prots
C (n  1) =
n 1X
i=1
i (16)
and the single public rm setting qP to maximise (4). The relevant FOCs
are
@C (n  1)
@qi
= a  2qi   s
 
qP   2
X
j 6=i
qj
!
= 0 (17)
for the cartel members, and still (9) for the public enterprise. Relying again
on symmetry across prot-seekers, the equilibrium outputs are
qCP (n  1) =
a [2 + s (3 (n  2)  b (n  1))]
s2 [n  2  b (n  1)] + 2 [s (n  2) + 1] (18)
qC (n  1) =
a (1  s)
s2 [n  2  b (n  1)] + 2 [s (n  2) + 1] (19)
The resulting prots per cartel member would be
C (n  1) =
a2 (1  s)2 [1 + s (n  2)]
[2 (1 + s (n  2))  (2  b+ b (n  1)) s2]2 (20)
We disregard the non-negativity analysis of qC (n  1) for we are about to
show that the policy maker nds it optimal to set b in such a way that, ex
post, private rms will not play collusively.
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4 The policy makers strategy against collu-
sion
In this section, we show how the policy maker can deter tacit collusion among
the population of private rms. The appropriate policy consists in ne tuning
the instrument b (the weight given to private prots in the maximand (4)
of the public enterprise resulting from nationalization). In other words, the
strategy amounts to (i) announcing the nationalization of a single rm out of
the initial n private ones, and (ii) adopting maximand (4) by the nationalised
company.
Lemma 3 Let a > 0 and s 2 [0; 1]. C (n  1) < N (n  1) for all b 2
(b ; b+) :
Proof. The solutions of C (n  1) = N (n  1) w.r.t. b are
b =
1 + s (1 + s) (n  2)p1 + s (n  2)
(n  1) s2 (21)
Moreover, it can be easily checked that C (n  1)  N (n  1) is convex in
b, which implies that C (n  1) < N (n  1) for all b 2 (b ; b+) :
Hence, in this range, from the private rms standpoint, the game following
the nationalization is no longer a prisonersdilemma.
Proposition 4 Let a > 0 and s 2 [0; 1]. For all
n 2
"
2;
2s [5 + 2s (s  3)]  1 +p1 + 4s (1  s)
2s (1  s)2  en
#
;
bb 2 (b ; b+). Hence, for all n 2 [2; en], in the mixed oligopoly equilibrium, the
n  1 private rms are active and play noncooperatively.
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Proof. The proof that b+ > bb is straightforward and therefore omitted. The
sign of bb  b  is the sign of
[2 (2  s)  n (1  s)] s  1 +
p
1 + s (n  2) (22)
which is positive for all
n < en = 2s [5 + 2s (s  3)]  1 +p1 + 4s (1  s)
2s (1  s)2 (23)
For all s 2 [0; 1] ; en > 2: Moreover, en is increasing and convex in s; with
lims!1 en = 1, and lims!0 en = 6 by de lHôpital rule. Therefore, in any
point (b; n) belonging to the regionn
b 2

b ;bb ; n 2 (2; en)o (24)
in the mixed oligopoly and all quantities, by Lemma 2, are strictly positive
and collusion is not protable.
Notice that, for all n > en; b  > bb; and therefore any b 2 (b ; b+) trivially
eliminates the prisonersdilemma among private rms because, by Lemma
2, these are driven out of the market and the industry becomes a public
monopoly replicating perfect competition.
The message stemming from Proposition 4 can be summarised as follows.
Since product di¤erentiation increases rmsprots, the nationalization of
a single rm and the choice of an appropriate weight assigned to private
prots in the public rms maximand, su¢ ce to contrast collusion only if n
is low enough. For s arbitrarily low but still positive, the upper bound of n
is 6. Conversely, if s is close to one, the threat of nationalization succeeds to
contrast collusion for any n. For intermediate values of s, the nationalization
of a single rm does not eliminate the incentive to collude for all n > en:
In such a region, we may conjecture that preventing collusion requires the
threat of nationalising more than one rm.
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The region
n
b 2

b ;bb ; n 2 (2; en)o identied in Proposition 4 is the
area below the curve en represented in Figure 1, drawn in the space (s; n).
Figure 1 The curve en in the space (s; n).
6
-
n
s
1
en
6
(0; 2)
5 Private and public incentives
In order to understand the consequences of the nationalization threat on their
own prots, private rms compare N (n) and 
N
 (n  1) :
N (n) N (n  1) =
a2 [s (3 + b (n  1)  2n)  1] [b (n  1) s2 + s2   4  s (2n  5)]
[2 + s (n  2) + s2 (n  b (n  1)  2)]2 [2 + s (n  1)]2
(25)
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the above expression is positive for all b outside the interval:
b1 =
s (2n  3) + 1
s (n  1) ; b2 =
s (2n  5) + 4  s2
s2 (n  1)

(26)
with b1 > bb for all fs; ng : This establishes:
Proposition 5 N (n) > 
N
 (n  1) for all b 2

0;bb :
This means that, facing the threat of nationalization, the ex ante n pri-
vate rms have a strict incentive to play noncooperatively avoiding thus the
danger of nding themselves in a mixed oligopoly where the public rm max-
imises a social welfare function which yields lower private prots than in the
Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
We can summarised the results spelled in Lemma 3 and Propositions 4-5
as follows:
Corollary 6 If n < en; N (n) > N (n  1) > C (n  1) for all b 2 b ;bb.
Proof. If n < en; b  < bb by Proposition 4; hence, for b 2 b ;bb ; we
have N (n) > 
N
 (n  1) by Proposition 5 and N (n  1) > C (n  1) by
Lemma 3.
In words, this means that, when the number of rms is su¢ ciently small,
the policy maker succeeds in inducing private rms to stick to the Cournot-
Nash behaviour. Moreover, in a mixed oligopoly, private rms, even if col-
luding, would get lower prots than in the fully private Cournot-Nash equi-
librium.
Now we have to ascertain whether the threat of nationalization is indeed
welfare-enhancing. This amounts to checking whether the ex post welfare
level is higher than the ex ante welfare level generated by the Cournot-Nash
equilibrium among n private rms. However, to do that, it su¢ ces to look
at aggregate output in the two scenarios:
QN (n) =
na
2 + s (n  1) (27)
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QN (n  1) = qNP (n  1) + (n  1) qN (n  1) = (28)
a [n+ 1  s (3 + b (n  1)  n)]
s [n  2  s (2  n+ b (n  1))]  2
The sign of QN (n) QN (n  1) is the sign of
(s  2) [s (3  2n+ b (n  1))  1]
s [2  n+ s (2  n+ b (n  1))]  2 (29)
where the numerator is positive for all b < b1; and the denominator is
negative for all b < b: Therefore, since b < b1 and, by Lemma 2, b > bb, we
know that QN (n) < QN (n  1) for all b < bb; which in turn implies
Proposition 7 SWN (n  1) > SWN (n) for all b 2

0;bb :
The combined reading of Propositions 5 and 7 tells that the threat of
nationalization is credible as it would increase welfare. Hence, since under
complete information private rms are aware of that, they are forced to
play the Cournot-Nash equilibrium ex ante, where they are better o¤ w.r.t.
the mixed oligopoly Cournot-Nash equilibrium. By setting b 2

0;bb in
the maximand of the (threatened) public rm, the policy maker disciplines
the n private rms without needing to carry out the threat. Needless to
say, for all b 2

0;bb, SWN (n  1) is also greater than SWM (n) as given
by (7). Hence, by means of the nationalization threat, the policy maker
achieves a level of social welfare which is intermediate between SWM (n)
and SWN (n  1). Moreover, the policy maker may prevent collusion also in
the mixed oligopoly only if n is su¢ ciently small. In that case, indeed, it will
be able to choose a value of b 2

b ;bb, which forces private rms to play
nonocooperatively. That is to say, our analysis boils down to the following:
Theorem 8 If b 2

0;bb ; in the mixed oligopoly all n rms are active,
N (n) > 
N
 (n  1) and SWN (n  1) > SWN (n) : The policy maker may
prevent collusion among the n   1 private rms also in the mixed oligopoly
only if n < en:
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To illustrate how the threat can be enforced, it is worth noting that
the maximum price that the policy maker is prepared to pay to acquire a
private rm is given by the cartel prot M (n). However, this would not be
the net e¤ect on the policy makers balance sheet, because the public rm
would make positive prots NP (n  1) in the prospected mixed oligopoly
equilibrium. At any rate, we may ignore the e¤ects of the acquisition in the
social welfare function (see fn. 5).
A threat is credible insofar as it doesnt need to be implemented. Since
this is the case within our setting, to credibly commit to the nationalization
strategy, the policy maker need only to allocate the di¤erence between M (n)
and NP (n  1) ; being aware that such amount will never be utilised. Hence,
the true cost of the commitment is given by the opportunity cost of such an
allocation in the balance sheet.
Our formulation of the nationalization threat ts the requirements sug-
gested by Schelling (1960) for a move to represent a credible commitment:
visibility, irreversibility and expensiveness. In Schellings words, indeed:
The rst point to observe is that a commitment, a promise or a threat can
usually be characterised in a fashion equivalent to the following: to make
one of these moves, a player selectively reduces - visibly and irreversibly -
some of his own payo¤ in the matrix. This is what the move amounts to.
(Schelling, 1960, p. 150, italics in the original)
6 Concluding remarks
Our paper develops a rst approach to modelling the deterring power of na-
tionalization in preventing collusion. We have shown how the policy maker
may prevent tacit collusion in a di¤erentiated oligopoly. The threat of na-
tionalising a private rm, coupled with the appropriate choice of the weight
given to private prots in the public rms maximand, forces private rms
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to escape from collusion.
The simplicity of our model implicitly suggests some extensions: we men-
tion two. The rst one amounts to considering multiple nationalization, i.e.,
the analysis of how many private rms should be expropriated for the threat
to be credible in deterring tacit collusion. The second more ambitious ex-
tension would entail modelling incomplete information by the policy maker
about technology and/or market demand. Both extensions are left for future
research.
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